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23 January 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 1/79)

NEAR
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CONTENTS

PAGE

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Saharan Minister Denies, Rejects Contacts With Morocco
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11-24 Dec 78) 1

Briefs
Arab Loan 2

ALGERIA

Exiled Politician Discusses Presidential Succession Prospects
(Ahmed Mashas Interview; PARIS MATCH, 8 Dec 78) 3

Briefs
Canadian Financing 8
1979 Oil Production 8
Consortium Bank Loan 9
Fuel Ration Increase 9

IRAN

Oil Crisis Analyzed, Warning Sounded on Link to 'Feudal' Regimes
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11 Dec 78) 10

ISRAEL

Former Zionist Leader Advocates Palestinian State
(Nahum Goldman Interview; PARIS MATCH, 29 Dec 78) 13

MOROCCO

Social Degradation, Official Corruption Described
(Mohamed Selhami; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 13 Dec 78) 19

Briefs
ADB Loans 23
FRG Company Agreement 23

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SAHARAN MINISTER DENIES, REJECTS CONTACTS WITH MOROCCO

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Dec 78 p 39 LD

[Unattributed report under rubric "Exclusive"]

[Text] Polisario Information Minister Ould Saleck has told us officially that "No official or unofficial contact has taken place between the Saharans and the Moroccans. This" he said, "is a blatant maneuver by those who mistake their desires for reality." It is a maneuver which King Hassan's propagandists in the so-called "African" press, published in Paris and financed by the Mobutus, Sneghors and Bongos of this world, used to stifle public opinion. "We have not had and will not have any contact with those who occupy our country." Ould Saleck added.

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ARAB LOAN--A group of Arab and international banks, headed by the Kuwaiti Company for Investment and Foreign Trade and the Arab and International Investment Bank, has granted a loan of 10 million Kuwaiti dollars (\$40 million) to the CNAN (National Algerian Shipping Company). According to the ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE, the credit agreement, which has just been signed in Kuwait, stipulates that this loan covers a duration period of 12 years, with 8 years grace period, at an interest rate of 8.5 percent. This credit, the fourth obtained by the CNAN on the Kuwaiti market, is intended to finance Algerian armament investments. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Dec 78 p 3368/ 8568

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ALGERIA

EXILED POLITICIAN DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION PROSPECTS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 8 Dec 78 pp 106-107

[Interview with Ahmed Mashas, former minister of agriculture, by Georges Menant: "It is Not Boumedienne Who Must Be Replaced but His Regime"; Paris, date not given]

[Text] The post-Boumedienne era is under way. Who will be the new masters of Algeria? What changes will that entail and what should be expected from them? One man is particularly qualified to answer these questions which everybody is asking. A liberation fighter right from the start, a political-military delegate from eastern Algeria, a member of the politburo of the National Liberation Front, Ahmed Mashas was Minister of Agriculture in independent Algeria, first under Ahmed Ben Bella and then under Houari Boumedienne at whose side he sat for a year in the Revolutionary Council. Obligated to go into exile, Ahmed Mashas leads in Paris today the "National Rally for Democracy and Revolution," a movement which set as its essential task the consolidation of the Algerian opposition. Georges Menant interviewed this man of the inner circle.

Question: Today President Houari Boumedienne is a dead man, at least politically. Yet, that individual used to hold all powers. This now confronts Algeria--and first its government, the Revolutionary Council--with a fearful vacuum.

Answer: Fearful, indeed, as always with dictators.

Question: But if Boumedienne became that kind of dictator, is that not the fault of the Revolutionary Council which allowed him free sway?

Answer: You know. Boumedienne was not an authoritative, imperious person--at least in appearance. At the start it happened several times that the Revolutionary Council placed him in a minority position.

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Question: And how did he react?

Answer: Very calmly. He was not the type of individual to raise his voice or bang the table with his fist. He preferred to act from a position of strength, seeking support outside. That is how he managed to enjoy personal rule--by doing exactly what Ahmed Ben Bella had been reproached with doing.

Question: He also had in the Revolutionary Council his unconditional supporters such as Abdelaziz Bouteflika whose name is often mentioned today in connection with Boumediene's succession.

Answer: Indeed, there existed a faction which used to form a block around Boumediene. Besides Bouteflika there was Cherif Belkacem..

Question: ...who was since retired even though he was for a long time considered as the spiritual son of the Master.

Answer: Ahmed Medighri...

Question: ...who passed as Boumediene's most intimate friend and who was found drowned in his bathtub three years ago.

Answer: And Kaid Ahmed, who died last year.

Question: There remains, then, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the last of the faithful.

Answer: I would not call it faithful. What was involved was a small group of men who had gathered around Boumediene to "stage a coup." Boumediene did not delay detaching himself from them to play his own game and monopolize all power.

Question: Even that of Bouteflika?

Answer: Even that of Bouteflika. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was in complete disagreement with the support given by Boumediene to the Saharans. This placed Algeria in a very embarrassing position of diplomatic isolation, starting with himself.

Question: In your eyes, then, Abdelaziz Bouteflika is not a credible successor?

Answer: No, beginning with the fact that all the others hate him.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because he is given to intrigues and does not recoil before anything to remain in office. Consider that this man of 41 has held his

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portfolio for the past 15 years, which makes of Bouteflika the dean of all ministers of foreign affairs in the world when it comes to length of tenure.

Question: Let us talk of the others. There is Mohamed Yahiaoui, the present "boss" of the FLN, is there not?

Answer: Yahiaoui is one of the most honest men on the team and he enjoys the halo conferred by the National Liberation Front.

Question: And especially, he has the benefit of the FLN apparatus.

Answer: True, but today's FLN, purged, tinkered with, perverted, is no longer anything more than the skeleton of the great party that it used to be. That is why I do not think that Mohamed Yahiaoui has much chance.

Question: How about Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, the minister of interior?

Answer: Obviously, the latter has the public administration available to him. But I can hardly see him in Boumediene's shoes. Personally, I would be inclined to bet on a man like Chadli, commander of the Oran military region. Boumediene wanted to remove Chadli from his command in order to appoint him to higher positions but Chadli did not hesitate to refuse.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because he was afraid of being sidelined. Like Ahmed Draia, the former director of State Security whom Boumediene, distrustful, had "promoted" to the position of Minister of Transportation, or Ahmed Bencherif, the former head of the gendarmerie who found himself Minister of Hydraulics, Land Development and Environmental Protection.

Question: There is a lot of talk of Bencherif at this time in the papers and on television.

Answer: Perhaps so, but it is still Chadli who seems to me the most likely successor of all to the presidency because it is he who has the best "strong man" profile.

Question: And if, failing to reach agreement on one of them, the members of the Revolutionary Council were to choose contrariwise a "weak man," a personality not in the front rank who would make a compromise possible?

Answer: That is indeed possible, at least for a while. But all of this would not solve anything basic. For the present regime has involved the country in such a grave situation that a change of individuals will not provide a solution, not even a change of team, only a change of regime.

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Question: But how could the regime be changed?

Answer: By calling on men of the period prior to 1965, before the Boumediene era, men who held high national positions--a Ferhat Abbas, for example.

Question: Abbas is 80 years old.

Answer: He could still serve in a transition government. He is a respected man, an indisputable democrat, who has good relations with everybody. I am also thinking of Benyussef Ben Khedda, the former president of the war-time GPRA [Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic], who lives under house arrest in Algerias but who continues to be "on call by the Republic." Ben Khedda is still young and he commands respect.

Question: And Ahmed Ben Bella?

Answer: Naturally, and everyone thinks of him first.

Question: But in fact is it known where he is?

Answer: Until lately he was at Cheragas near Algiers in an old farmhouse-castle of the Sahel. He has just been moved, undoubtedly because of the rumors of a plot born as a result of the escape of Major Mellah, who was compromised in the coup attempt by Colonel Zbiri. I do not know precisely the new site of his detention. But I have constantly been in touch with Ben Bella. Some of those close to him are authorized to visit him and naturally that makes it possible to exchange letters.

Question: Do the police close their eyes a little in this connection?

Answer: Naturally. It is such a scandal to keep a man like Ben Bella under house arrest, with everything that he represents for the Algerian people. And so many steps have been made in his favor, national and international, that the government could not remain insensitive to them.

Question: Yet, it is still Ben Bella who inaugurated personal rule in Algeria.

Answer: At any rate, I can tell you that he has changed his ideas a lot since 1965.

Question: Thirteen years have elapsed since 1965. Do you think that the name of Ahmed Ben Bella still means a lot in an Algeria half of whose population is under 16 years of age?

Answer: Much more than is imagined abroad, precisely because of the mystery which has continued to hover over his fate.

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Question: In short, you could easily see Ben Bella taking the place of President Boumedienne tomorrow?

Answer: A Ben Bella government, yes. With a good political team around him, it could work.

Question: At any rate, is a "de-Boumediene-ization" under way?

Answer: In politics, undoubtedly. Even if the present team continues in office, personal rule could no longer emerge. If an individual rises to the top, even a "strong man," this will only be with the consent of the others--a "primus inter pares" [first among equals] and nothing more.

Question: And in the economic realm what changes do you foresee?

Answer: On that score things will be much more difficult. Agriculture, completely dismantled by forced collectivization, sterilized by bureaucratism, needs to be rebuilt from scratch. And in the industrial sector things are even worse. Instead of using the existing structure, the myriad of small enterprises which we had inherited at the end of the colonial era, and of promoting industrial development through successive stages, respecting the needs, customs, and mentalities of the people, Boumediene sacrificed everything for the establishment of a heavy industry because of his megalomania, in order to pose as the economic leader of the Third World. The result has been a monumental waste of investments, of gigantic plants which produce at 30 to 40 percent capacity.

Question: Is it still possible to change that?

Answer: Basically, no. Such options are irreversible. Facilities cannot be scraped. But on the other hand, it is possible to improve their management and therefore their profitability considerably.

Question: How?

Answer: By decentralizing, by restoring the maximum degree of autonomy at all levels, by restoring responsibility to people. Bad management is the direct result of the concentration of power which transforms the entire country into a system of superimposed umbrellas.

Question: To change that is then to change the regime, is it not?

Answer: Yes. And accumulated dissatisfactions are such that Algeria will have to change its regime in short order. Accordingly, it would be better to do it calmly than hot-headedly.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

CANADIAN FINANCING--On 12 December the Export Expansion Company (SEE) of Canada and the Toronto-Dominion Bank put the finishing touches on arrangements made with 39 other Canadian and foreign banks for the granting of a loan in the amount of \$667 million to Algeria. The SEE will supply \$417 million of this loan, which is to extend over a period of 13 years. The financing agreement applies to a contract granted to the firm, Bechtel Canada Ltd., for setting up a natural-gas plant in the Rhourde Nouss area southeast of Hassi Messaoud. This contract, made by SONATRACH (National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Fuels) and announced on 16 May 1978 (MTM of 19 May, page 1314), provides for the designing, engineering, equipping, project management, construction and complete start-up of a gas-collection network, a processing unit and a system for gas reinjection. The Rhourde Nouss installation will produce dry natural gas for sale and reinjection, liquid propane and butane and condensate for the gasoline supply stock of the refinery. In announcing the signing of the SONATRACH-Bechtel contract last May, we indicated that the recoverable reserves of the Rhourde Nouss deposits were estimated to be 200 million cubic meters of natural gas and that the annual production should reach 12 million cubic meters of dry gas, 2.6 million tons of condensate and 900,000 tons of liquid propane (GPL). Text /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Dec 78 p 3491/ 8568

1979 OIL PRODUCTION--"SONATRACH has already sold its entire oil production for 1979," Ahmed Ghozali, Algerian minister of energy and petrochemical industries, stated. In an interview published on 4 December in a report entitled, "Middle East Economic Survey," Mr Ghozali indicated that the overall oil production for 1978 will be about 57 million tons in comparison with the 53.5 million tons of 1977. The 1979 production is expected to be about 58 or 59 million tons. "If we deduct the 5 million or so tons needed for local consumption, we find that the export capability for 1979 will be between 53 and 54 million compared with the 52 million we had in 1978," he added. In regard to relations between OPEC and consumer countries, Mr Ghozali stated: "We share Saudi Arabia's viewpoint according to which we are an integral part of the overall world economic system. Therefore, we should safeguard the economy of the industrialized world; but we should likewise safeguard our own economy, which is also threatened. We should consider the well-being of industrialized countries, but we must also look after our own well-being." Mr Ghozali refused to make any predictions in regard to an increase in the price of oil, which might be decided at the next

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OPEC meeting to be held in Abu Dhabi. However, he stressed the losses of the oil countries indicating that the prices of imported products had increased 50 percent since the OPEC conference held in Doha 2 years ago. Lastly, the Algerian minister indicated that, in addition to the Algerian-Italian pipeline project, Algeria is presently studying the construction of another line toward Europe via Spain, but that this project will not be carried out until 1986. Text / Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Dec 78 p 3368/ 8568

CONSORTIUM BANK LOAN--A loan in the amount of \$125 million has been granted to the National Bank of Algeria (BNA) by a consortium of international banks composed principally of large French banks. An agreement to this effect was signed on 30 November by representatives of the BNA and those of the consortium, whose principal constituents are the National Bank of Paris and the Mediterranean Union of Banks, the latter, moreover, playing the role of agent in this operation. The duration of the loan is 7 years with a grace period of 3 years; interest is at the interbanking rate on the Eurodollar market (LIBOR) increased by 1 percent for the first 3 years and by 1.25 percent for the last 4 years. This loan is being made to finance investments necessary for the development of the economy. An Algerian source emphasizes that this operation was carried out "under conditions which were definitely more favorable than those obtained heretofore by Algerian economic operators." Text / Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Dec 78 p 3368/ 8568

FUEL RATION INCREASE--To forestall any possible coup d'etat, President Boumediene allowed his armored units to have only a limited amount of fuel: just enough for 2 hours running time. One of the first steps taken by the interim minister of defense, Colonel Chadli, who was installed in office on 28 November, was to increase this amount. It is now possible for the tanks to reach the capital--and exert pressure in the event of a difficult [presidential] succession. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Dec 78 p 31]

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IRAN

OIL CRISIS ANALYZED, WARNING SOUNDED ON LINK TO 'FEUDAL' REGIMES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 176, 11 Dec 78 pp 44,45

[Article by "N.S.": "Consequences of the Crisis in Iran for the Oil Situation"]

[Text] Whatever the turn of events in Iran, it is beginning to seem that neither Iranian oil policy nor the privileged position occupied by that nation at the bosom of OPEC can continue unchanged. The test of strength that has begun between the shah's regime and his opposition has already had two important consequences. The first and most serious is the drop of about 75 percent in oil production since the end of October, an output of about 1.4 million barrels per day over the last two weeks as against an average 5,625,100 during the period of January to August, 1978. The second, less spectacular although not negligible, is the decision to freeze the overly ambitious Iranian nuclear program, maintaining it until further orders at the four power plants presently under construction, which represent 4200 MW or 18.26 percent of the total of 23,000 anticipated for the beginning of 1990.

In the future, everything will depend on developments in the political crisis--how long the present political problems continue, whether there will be a compromise with the opposition or the shah will be overthrown and replaced by a more nationalistic and less pro-American regime.

Domestically, first of all, the cutbacks in the nuclear program should automatically result in an acceleration of efforts directed toward developing the local consumption of gas. All the more so since the gas from the well-head burned within the nation in 1977 represented not less than 46.4 percent of the total output. Even with natural gas, the low level of world prices has been inducing Iran since 1977 to hold back on its exportation plans and encourage the replacement of other fuels by natural gas, especially in heating plants. Thus, today more than ever before, it is well-head and natural gas and not nuclear power that is turning out to be the main energy source that needs to be developed to counteract decreased oil reserves and increase national consumption demands.

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Toward "Iranization"

Domestically again, the Iranian opposition is vigorously advancing demands that may weigh heavily on the future of the consortium of foreign firms that has been ensuring almost 90 percent of the nation's oil production for 25 years. These demands are concerned in particular with the "Iranization" of the responsible positions in the oil business and with the expulsion of a large part of the foreign technicians, in other words, with the more stringent application of the law concerning the nationalization of Iranian petroleum enacted by Dr Mohammed Mossadegh in 1951.

The problem is even more delicate because negotiations begun more than a year ago by the Iranian government with the consortium to revise the 1973 agreement are already running into serious difficulties due in particular to the low level of enthusiasm shown by the corporate members of the cartel for increasing their investments in oil exploration and augmenting their take of Iranian crude oil. This means that a radical modification of its relations with the consortium would make a basic, top to bottom, revision of all of Iran's petroleum policies and economic policies inevitable.

Internationally, the severe reduction in Iranian oil production would have had no dramatic effect on world supplies unless it had lasted for two or three months, and this would have been just as much the result of stock-piling by the large industrial countries (generally three months' supply) as of potentials for increased production in those OPEC countries that have unutilized production capacities at their disposal, mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Abu Dhabi. At the moment it doesn't seem very probable in any case that the drop in Iranian production will last too long in view of the catastrophic effects such a situation would have on a country--no matter what its political system--in which the approximately \$23 billion in oil receipts represent nearly 68 percent of its budgetary revenue and 90 percent of its foreign exchange.

In the area of pricing, finally, the lack of profits brought on by the drop in oil production, perhaps nearly \$350 million per week, puts the shah in an extremely uncomfortable situation. He finds himself, really, torn between two worrisome contradictions, wanting on the one hand to increase both oil prices and output to compensate for the loss of profits and pay back the foreign debts that already amount to between \$10 and 12 billion, and on the other, to recompense the Americans for their support of the throne of the Pahlavis by maintaining a "moderate" pricing policy.

The December 16 meeting

If the king is still on the throne, the next OPEC meeting, scheduled for December 16, will show which contradiction he means to give priority. Meanwhile, the experiences of the last few years have shown again and again that the more the Iranian sovereign feels the need for United States support, the more conciliatory he can be in the area of pricing.

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Furthermore, and independent of the Iranian government's attitude, the price adjustments that began in January 1979 will depend to a great extent on the market situation, which is characterized by increasing tensions following the severe reduction in Iranian exports over the last two weeks.

Finally, on a more general level, one of the main conclusions to be drawn from the Iranian crisis concerns the instability of the policy, followed by certain industrial nations, which connects the insurance of their petroleum supply replacement with the support of regimes that are politically unpopular and characterized as "pro-Western" in the OPEC countries. It is strange to notice in this respect that in none of the OPEC countries considered "radical" is there any question, either on the part of their governments or their oppositions, of interrupting petroleum exports destined for the Western nation or Japan.

Once again, events in Iran show that the best method of ensuring the security of oil supplies is to reconcile the oil requirements of the consuming nations with the national interests and actual development needs of the exporting nations and by no means with the interests of feudal and corrupt regimes.

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ISRAEL

FORMER ZIONIST LEADER ADVOCATES PALESTINIAN STATE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 29 Dec 78 pp 72-73

[Interview with Dr Nahum Goldman, former president of the World Jewish Congress, by Ben Porat: "The United States Should Put Pressure on Begin"; Paris, date not given]

[Text] The attitude of intransigence of the Israeli Government in the present peace negotiations with Egypt does not have the complete approval of the world Jewish community. Far from it, as is evidenced by this interview with Dr Nahum Goldman by our colleague Ben Porat. Over 83 years of age, Dr Nahum Goldman, who lives in Paris, is the most prestigious leader of the Jewish Diaspora in the world. Until 2 years ago (he has still not been replaced) he was president of the World Jewish Congress, the organization at the top of the hierarchy of Jewish communities in the world. As the head of the Zionist movement which underlies the state of Israel, Dr Goldman had negotiated with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer the reparations paid by Germany to the Jews. Goldman was mentioned several times in connection with an important position in the Israeli Government. Today, his views are rarely appreciated by Jerusalem.

Question: You have been steadily pessimistic since the start of the negotiations. You even said: "Take care, this cannot succeed." Why were you pessimistic when so many others were optimistic?

Answer: I have been claiming for the past 10 years that without the large-scale intervention of the United States in the Middle East through pressure, peace will not come about. In October 1978 I stated that the party really responsible for the lack of peace in the Middle East was not Israel or the Arabs but rather the United States which, for reasons of domestic policy and in order not to cooperate too closely with the Soviet Union in the Middle East, has supported Israel's policy which consisted in the maintenance of the status quo as long as possible.

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I told President Anwar al-Sadat in Jerusalem: "You have done a very courageous thing but you will not achieve rapid success. You may need a lot of time."

The great merit of Sadat is to have convinced numerous Israelis that there are Arabs who want peace. When I had said the same thing I was treated as naive and a simpleton.

Question: Egypt is now posing the conditions that you know, especially a schedule to set up Palestinian autonomy and the cancellation of Article 6 [of the draft peace treaty] which gives absolute priority to this treaty over all of Egypt's other commitments, especially those with the Arab states. Would you accept these terms?

Answer: Before answering, I wish to specify that I am speaking in my name, on an individual basis, and that I do not represent either Israel or the Zionist movement in any way.

I believe that these discussions about Article 6 and the linkage of the treaty with the Palestinian problem are legal absurdities which are excuses not to sign the peace treaty. What does the famous linkage signify? Is it indispensable because the Americans stress the need for a solution for the Palestinians?

I want to say that I admire Prime Minister Menachem Begin a lot. He is the most moderate of the lot. He is more moderate than the late Mrs Golda Meir was and much more moderate than Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. The unfortunate thing is that a certain left wing in Israel is much more extremist than Begin and refuses to accept the need to return the occupied [Arab] territories. But without a solution of the Palestinian problem there will never be peace and a separate peace with Anwar al-Sadat would not last 3 months.

Question: Do you believe in the autonomy proposed by Begin to the Palestinians?

Answer: I do not believe that the Palestinians would be content with autonomy for long. Within 2 or 3 years a Palestinian state could be established, linked perhaps with Jordan.

Question: What would you do if you were the Israeli Prime Minister?

Answer: I have never had the ambition of becoming prime minister in the past and I do not have the ambition of occupying that position at my age. But if I were in the Prime Minister's place I would help establish a Palestinian state federated with Jordan and Israel. This would be a kind of European Common Market in the Middle East.

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Question: Could you do that in a month as [former French Prime Minister] Pierre Mendes-France had made peace in Indochina?

Answer: I would need 2 or 3 months.

Question: You talk of American pressure. How could it be applied?

Answer: In May 1978 the United States ambassador in Israel came to see me and told me: "My friend, I came to see you with a note pad and you will dictate to me your proposals as to how to pressure Israel." I replied: "My dear ambassador, if I had to tell you how to put pressure in Israel you would have to resign tomorrow from your diplomatic post. Do you lack the means to influence Israel?" The whole of international politics consists in pressure: Pressure on France, pressure of France on Germany, of Germany on Britain, and so on. International politics is not a girls' club.

Question: Specifically, what could the United States do to achieve peace?

Answer: I shall give you an example. My friend Henry Kissinger, who is again very popular in Israel, was at one time hated by that entire country. That was when the Israelis refused to make concessions to implement Kissinger's policy with Egypt and Syria. He then practiced what is called a "time of reflection" in his relations with Israel. He did not exert pressure but said that he needed arms for Vietnam, that the bank did not sign the checks--in short, he found all kinds of excuses, and 6 months later Israel accepted 90 percent of what it had refused earlier. Accordingly, I take good care not to give advice to the Americans. But it is obvious that they have the means to cause peace to come about in the Middle East.

Question: In other words, you wish Israel to capitulate?

Answer: This is not capitulation. If Israel won territories thanks to wartime action and is forced by international politics to return these territories, that is not capitulation. History has 100 examples of this kind.

Question: Should pressure not be applied on Egypt, too? Sadat seems to be right all down the line and Begin, wrong.

Answer: Yes, pressure should also be applied to Egypt. Regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations Menachem Begin is right.

Question: Should ambassadors be exchanged immediately between Jerusalem and Cairo?

Answer: Immediately, because to drag things out would mean that the matter is not serious. Regarding tourism and trade, immediate action is needed because that would set an example for the other Arabs.

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However, I am completely in agreement with Sadat that he cannot appear to be an individual who plans a separate peace with Israel because that would be the end of his career.

Question: You know Menachem Begin well. Would you say that Begin is an obstacle to peace?

Answer: No, on the contrary. Begin is now a moderate leader. Begin surprised me with his "flexibility" and ability to compromise. He is ready to return the whole of the Sinai and he is ready to liquidate the [Israeli] settlements in the Sinai. That is a great sacrifice for him for it constitutes a rejection of his 40 years of political endeavors.

Begin is not the obstacle. Rather, the obstacle is Israeli policy which began with David Ben Gurion and was reinforced by Golda Meir who was a great personality who I have always admired but who was so strong that her mistakes and errors were also very big. Everything that she did was grand--her successes as well as her setbacks.

I admire Begin for having had the courage to make so many concessions. That is why he comes up against major opposition within his party--to such a point that he risks losing his majority.

Question: Because of his party?

Answer: No, because of the members of the Israeli Labor Party who would not approve autonomy [for the Palestinians]. This is a moral scandal because even Ben Gurion would never have acted in this way. Today there is no one in Israel who has the prestige and authority of Ben Gurion to make the kind of concessions that he would have agreed to make. Do you recall the courage that Ben Gurion needed to issue the order for Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in 1957 after the Suez war?

Question: What is your opinion of the attitude of the leaders of the West Bank of the Jordan who refuse to negotiate?

Answer: In my opinion, the Palestinian leaders of the West Bank would commit a major error if they refused to negotiate. They have to negotiate. If they don't they will play into the hands of the Jewish extremists.

Question: Do you believe that Moshe Dayan is more moderate than Begin today?

Answer: Yes, without question. Dayan accepted things that Begin refused. But he does not have great influence because he has no party backing behind him. Dayan depends entirely on Begin and, at each movement, Begin can fire him. The most moderate official is the Israeli minister of defense, Ezer Weizman.

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Question: There is talk in France of a reactivation of anti-Semitism. Is that correct?

Answer: No. Since World War II and Auschwitz, the non-Jews have treated the Jews with kid gloves. Without Auschwitz there would not have been a Jewish state. If two-thirds of the members of the United Nations voted for the partition [of Palestine], that was because of Auschwitz. At that time [1947] even the Russians and the democracies felt the need to compensate the Jews. But that is beginning to change. During the last few years, in many of my speeches, I have warned the Jews about the end of this favorable attitude of non-Jewish public opinion and the surfacing of a certain degree of normalization, that is, new evidence of anti-Semitism.

If Israel continues to project the appearance of being the obstacle to peace in the public opinion, I fear that a wave of anti-Semitism will recur in a few years. Not a new Auschwitz, to be sure, but an intellectual anti-Semitism that is already being felt very strongly in the United States. My son, who is a professor at Harvard University, tells me about a "discretionary" anti-Semitism lurking in some way in the background but which is not articulated. Today, anti-Semitism is still a shadow, but that is threatening to change.

Question: French television has just bought the series of film sequences on the Holocaust. Is that a good thing?

Answer: Yes. It is very good from the viewpoint of enlightening public opinion about Auschwitz. From the intellectual viewpoint I was told that it was a disaster, a "kitsch," a lemon. Elie Wiesel, who is the greatest writer on the Holocaust, declared: "For the Jews this film is an insult against God." However, I think it is a good thing that Mrs Simone Veil [French Minister of Health and Family] should have asked for its presentation and that French television should have shown it.

Question: Finally, as far as peace is concerned are you pessimistic or optimistic?

Answer: Despite everything that I have said, for the first time I am very optimistic about peace because the United States needs it. America fears new problems--oil and others. Then, everybody is tired of the Israeli problem, of this small state which for the past 30 years has occupied the attention of public opinion every day, that is, more than China and the Soviet Union combined. In the long run the non-Jews will no longer accept this state of affairs. And since the United States is the decisive factor and Israel cannot exist without American support, I am sure that President Jimmy Carter will achieve peace. The genuine guarantee is its formal underwriting by the United States and the Soviet Union and the temporary presence of United States forces in the Middle East as in Germany. The Israeli thesis according to which such a presence would be a violation of sovereignty is absurd. The Germans would be very concerned if the Americans were to plan to withdraw one of their regiments. The Soviet Union is now prepared to

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participate in providing such a guarantee with the United States. For all these reasons I am optimistic for the first time in 30 years about peace. It is the indispensable condition for Israel's becoming what it must be, that is, the spiritual center of the Jewish people. If it does not create such a center the Jewish existence risks being brought into question once more.

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2662
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MOROCCO

SOCIAL DEGRADATION, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Dec 78 pp 79-80

[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "The Other Face in Morocco--the One Which Is Not Well Known and Which People Do Not Talk About--the Face of the Little Moroccan"]

[Text] Three years after the epic of the Green March, which made it possible to recover the Saharan provinces, the faces always indicate the people's satisfaction over being Moroccans. "Tomorrow we will be rich", the Moroccans are fond of saying, for recent discoveries of petroleum (JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 929) have made them very optimistic. The country is in a state of effervescence, and its emotional state is accentuated even more by a free press intoxicated by this new acquisition.

Morocco has set out on the road to democracy. Nevertheless, it has three years of austerity ahead of it. The transitional three-year plan will go into effect beginning in December. From now on, there is to be no more waste and no more negligence. It will be necessary to face up to difficulties, and difficulties certainly do exist, if one only were to consider those which a number of Moroccans encounter in their everyday life.

A child loitering under the indifferent gaze of the proprietor of the fruit and vegetable stall, an adolescent who smiles seductively at a Kuwaiti tourist, a noisy native quarter exuding filthiness and a cafe teeming with sad-looking unemployed men--that Morocco is not to be found in a Mediterranean Club hermetically sealed to the natives nor in a kaïd's tent surrounded by "makhaznis", and it is still less to be found around an organized meal of whole lamb roasted on a spit. And yet nothing is more perceptible than the poverty of the little people. It is in every street and every douar. It is a poverty which is not entirely explained by the state of war in which the country has been existing for four years, even though great efforts are accepted on behalf of an army which fights beyond its borders--since some of its elements traveled thousands of kilometers to go and "set things in order" in Shaba. To be sure, the lives and the chances of survival of a minority are not altered or threatened in the slightest. The middle class

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has never been as comfortable as it is now, four years after the fighting in the Sahara began. There are always people whom a war makes rich. The king himself recognized the truth of this statement when he told the members of Parliament, on 13 October 1978, "I will not conceal from you the fact that, if we continue on the path we are now following, we will end up by being a society in which the poor are very poor and the rich excessively rich. The gap will become a gulf which will soon be transformed inescapably into a differentiation between classes."

The king used the future tense, perhaps out of discretion, for he knows better than anyone else that those differences already exist. The policy pursued in the past by the colonialists, giving the city privileges over the country, has left perceptible traces. For example, the wild exodus continues. For another example, the Moroccans have recently been keeping track of the case--one case among a number of others--of a village located in the Oued Mellah Valley, between Rabat and Casablanca. The inhabitants support themselves by market gardening. One day, enormous conduits were installed in the valley which were intended to supply the city of Casablanca with drinking water. Since then, there has been no more potable water in the village and the population has been loud in its criticism of the expenditure of millions of dirhams (1 dirham - 1.05 French francs) to produce such an absurdity. This demonstrates the lack of foresight, the tendency to extemporize and the indifference of certain people in responsible positions with respect to the underprivileged population.

Is it necessary to recall the corruption, which has become chronic, and from which only the humble suffer? The poor man has to struggle against an unscrupulous administration. Its slowness and lack of a sense of responsibility discourage the most optimistic. Go visit a town hall in any village at all. There you will see a riotous assemblage of people who have been waiting for hours, in the greatest disorder, to be received by an employee of the office. Some of them have come seeking a simple official certificate, but they have to wait for two days or three days, and sometimes even a whole week, unless a hand that is "in the know" slips a bill into a pocket of the employee discreetly. For such a traffic policeman, no infraction is serious if it is "covered" by a few dirhams.

This attitude of the administration paralyzes the country's vital forces. While we were there, we met a Moroccan executive who, up until a month ago, was managing a small enterprise producing chemical products for use in agriculture. A.T. is a chemical engineer who was educated in Europe. At the age of 32, he already has accumulated a history of solid experience in management through occupying positions of responsibility in the administration and in the private sector. Two years ago, A.T. established an enterprise producing agricultural material in which he employed about a dozen people. His officially declared turnover was 10,000 dirhams, but he already owns two trucks. His knowledge of agricultural matters helped him to expand his enterprise, which became one of the largest in the region within a year.

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Then the engineer found himself obliged to borrow money, but no bank was willing to come to his assistance, giving as their reason the absence of any guarantee and his alleged lack of a reputation in the business world. As for the local authorities, they added to A.T.'s troubles by the slowness with which they delivered certain administrative papers. He got the impression that he was the victim of a plot aimed at discouraging him, and they succeeded in doing so since he ended up by ceding his business to a big company.

"One has no confidence in Moroccan managerial personnel," says this engineer. "One considers them incapable of thinking and exercising leadership. It is still the colonial complex which prevails. Believe it or not, private businesses give preference to a European, even if he is inexperienced, and even in the government a European is better received than a Moroccan. This proves that the Moroccans are still far from considering themselves independent since their government functionaries remain mentally colonized." He adds: "The liberal society is not favorable to a small business, which is stifled by the big ones, and the state does not do anything about it. In our country, people try to copy France too much, without taking the actual situation in this country into account. Quite simply, it is impossible for Moroccan executives to be creative, so they live at the expense of others."

A.T.'s story is just one example among many others, for one rarely finds a small business in Morocco which succeeds in making its way if the person responsible for its management does not bear a well-known name. That state of affairs is aggravated on the level of the small fellah, who lived on his small plot of ground not long ago but now is obliged to allow himself to be absorbed by his rich neighbor. In agricultural regions such as the Gharb, properties 6,000 and 8,000 hectares in size are not rare, and a single person owns three or four farms simultaneously.

The inequalities which our engineer finds revolting do not cause the man in the street to shudder. He is too used to them, and then there are the immediate difficulties which have to be solved every hour of the day. That is what Khadija T., 15 years of age, of Beni Mellal, thinks. She has never been to school, and she has been traveling around the country by hitchhiking for two years. Naturally, she pays for her journeys "in kind" and asks for a small sum of money in addition. This sort of life was imposed on her by her family in order to be able to bring up her six brothers and sisters. Already, Khadija has no illusions. "I have nothing against my parents. They are so poor that there was no other solution for them than to send me out to carry on this occupation. It will soon be six years since my father began looking for a job--in vain. He is 70 years old." Khadija prefers to engage in this "work" somewhere other than in Beni Mellal. "Perhaps some day I will need to find myself a husband."

Hashish and the Policeman

Khadija's fate does not sitr up the people very much. The girls of her age who haunt the working-class districts of the cities are numerous, just like the young boys who spend their time loafing all day long, taking hashish and

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doing a number of other things--including sliding a piece of bread into an exhaust pipe to bring it out covered with residual gasoline. There are numerous examples, and some of them border on the absurd. In May, two inhabitants of Sidi Allal Tazi (Gharb) who had gotten into a quarrel went to find a sergeant of the local police. He reconciled them by demanding 1,500 dirhams from each of them. In that affair, although the policeman's attitude is revolting, that of the plaintiffs is distressing. Are the Moroccans so accustomed to such behavior that they no longer even think of defending themselves?

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MOROCCO

BRIEFS

ADB LOANS--Minister of Finance Abdellatif Ghissassi presided on 29 November in Rabat over the ceremony of the signing of three loan agreements with the African Development Bank (ADB) in the presence of M'hamed Douiri, minister of equipment and national promotion, and Abdelkader Benslimane, president and general manager of the BNDE (National Economic Development Bank). Kwame Fordwar, president and general manager of the ADB, signed the agreements on behalf of that institution. Amounting to nearly 80 million dirhams (1 dirham = 1.10 franc approximately), the three loan agreements are intended for use in financing the projects of the Sid Driss Dam for irrigating the Haouz area and bringing drinking water to Marrakech from the neighboring channel (loan granted to the ONEP, National Office for Drinking Water), as well as providing a line of credit to the BNDE. During the ceremony held for the signing of the loan agreements, Abdellatif Ghissassi pointed out that ADB assistance to Morocco now comes to 36.5 million accounting units /UC, 1 UC = \$17 or nearly 200 million dirhams. We may recall in this regard that the ADB held its second multilateral meeting in Rabat on 27 and 28 November and that this meeting was devoted to the study of questions pertaining to the opening of ADB capital to subscriptions from non-African countries. The non-African states participating in this meeting decided to meet again in Abidjan from 9 to 12 January 1979 in order to pursue the study of the documents given them by the ADB pursuant to their association with that institution. The 70 delegates representing 23 non-African countries have accepted certain conditions proposed by the ADB for membership. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 78 p 3431/ 8568

FRG COMPANY AGREEMENT--The BRPM (Mineral Exploration and Investment Bureau) of Morocco and the West German company, Klöckner, signed an agreement on 14 December in Rabat pertaining to the exploration and exploitation of the Azegour tungsten deposit located in the Marrakech area. The agreement was signed by Abderrafii Guessous, BRPM's general manager, and by Dr Remy and Mr Keller, representatives of the Klöckner group, during a ceremony presided over by Moussa Saadi, minister of energy and mines, in the presence of Taieb Skalli, secretary general of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, Karbid Mohamed, director of mines in the same ministry, Mohamed Diouri, BRPM's secretary general, and several other individuals. According to the terms of this agreement, a considerable exploration program will be undertaken to verify the reserves for purposes of industrial exploitation of the Azegour deposit within the framework of a joint company, which will consist of the two parties in question. The agreement also

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provides for an expansion of the cooperation between the BRPM and the Klöckner group, particularly in regard to the exploration and exploitation of uranium, for which negotiations are underway. In a speech given on this occasion, Moussa Saadi stressed the importance of the Azegour deposit, which was discovered toward the beginning of the century and whose reserves are abundant.
/Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Dec 78 p 349/ 8568

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